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Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been utilized extensively in both developed and developing countries to
provide various public services and infrastructure. The literature points tomany common critical success factors,
including a mature financial market, transparent regulatory framework, advanced technology, and people's ac-
ceptance of new forms, but those can vary from country to country. South Korea's mature market capitalist sys-
tem and strong regulatory framework have led to somewhat successful infrastructure provision through PPPs at
the national level, but as our two cases of urban transportation in the SeoulMetropolitanArea indicate, local-level
PPPs have demonstratedmixed results. By elaborating on the factors that affect the outcomes of PPPs at the local
level, we argue that under a relatively new local democracy, Korean cities are likely to be susceptible to producing
unfair contracts mainly due to limited local fiscal authority and resources, opportunistic behavior of local politi-
cians, anunderdeveloped urban institutional framework for PPPs, and the rise of new conditions such as econom-
ic nationalism intermixed with speculative foreign investment.








Although the term Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) has been used
rather loosely, it is generally understood to be an arrangementwhereby
the private sector steps in to jointly share authority, responsibility,
resources, risks, and benefits in the provision of public services and in-
frastructure (Hodge & Greve, 2007; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). PPPs
have been eagerly adopted by many local governments, especially
with the prevailing neoliberal agendas and the decline of the welfare
state in the West (Bloomfield, 2006; Williams, 2003; Sclar, 2015). It
has also widely spread to the Third World, pushed by international do-
nors, to address urban infrastructure deficits amid rapid urbanization
and decentralization (Bennett, 1998; Miraftab, 2004). In short, local
PPPs have become a global trend—a result that is surprising considering
their controversial outcomes.
On the one hand, PPPs are expected to lead to greater efficiencies by
increasing the role of the private sector in public service provision
(Osborne, 2001). Hodge and Greve (2007, 550–2) have cited many ex-
amples of successful PPP projects, describing them as value-for-money
propositions. On the other hand, concernshave been raised about sever-
al unintended outcomes—cost overruns, co-optation, poor feasibility
studies, and corruption, to name a few—that are commonly observed
in developing cities in Asia (Tam, 1999; ESCAP, 2012). A number of
signs of PPP ‘failures’ have been noted, especially among public trans-
portation PPPs, which are becoming increasingly popular in growing
mega-cities across the globe. These failures include unachieved value-
for-money, cancelled concessions, halted projects, nationalization of
the projects, and suspended contracts (Soomro & Zhang, 2013). While
PPPs appear ideal in their conception, they seem to easily succumb to
malpractice.
Furthermore, when it comes to examining non-Western societies,
the political and institutional environments in which local PPPs operate
become critical, as one can no longer assume the existence of well-
established local democracies and a functioning market economy. In
such cases, the political and institutional frameworks in which the PPP
contracts are designed and operated need to be more carefully exam-
ined. Studying PPPs in the developingworld,Miraftab (2004), for exam-
ple, identified the unequal playing field and distribution of power
between the government and the private sector as an important factor
undermining PPPs.
For South Korea (hereafter “Korea”), its advanced economic position
in the international economy as a result of the ‘developmental state’ sys-
tem provides a favourable and relatively reliable condition for financial
and commercial activities at the national level. As a result, the country
has become an attractive and profitable place for PPPs. Similar desirable
conditionsmight not exist on the local level, however, amid Korea's rel-
atively short history of local democracy and decentralization. In fact, de-
spite some successful PPP cases at the national level, the outcome of
subnational PPP-led infrastructure development has been questionable.
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As of 2013, the total debt of 244 local governments attributable to un-
successful PPP infrastructure projects was 126 trillion Korean won
(about 12 US billion dollars). What explains such outcomes of local
PPPs in Korea?Why and how are long-termPPP contracts compromised
at the local level?
While national-level PPPs and their successes and failures have been
relatively well reported in the literature, local PPPs still remain under-
explored in Korea. This study scrutinizes the factors and institutional
conditions that impede the success of local PPPs in Korean cities. In gen-
eral, Korean local governments are susceptible to the following three
problems: lack of financial resources, increasing demands from citizens
under local democracy, and structurally induced political interests of
local politicians. To further scrutinize how some of these elements
might affect local PPPs, the paper examines two highly controversial
local PPP cases of public transportation infrastructure in the Seoul Met-
ropolitan Area (SMA): Light Rail Transit and Metroline.
Despite takingplace in the SMA—Korea's economic and political cen-
tre, with the strongest market potential—the two PPPs generatedmuch
criticism due to local governments' massive financial losses in the con-
tracts. They also gained significant attention from the mass media and
the public for involving international legal disputes between the local
governments and global investors, and for failing to meet the original
intentions of the PPP contracts. For the case studies, we carried out field-
work in the cities of Yong-In and Seoul in July 2014 and February 2015,
including interviewswith political elites and relevant policymakers.We
also conducted a comprehensive review of public documents issued by
local and national governments, and of press releases.While there is the
risk of making generalizations from the two cases, we believe that they
are a good representation of the recent trend of local PPPs in Korea,
where foreign and domestic investors are becoming increasingly in-
volved in major urban infrastructure projects. In addition, because the
cases have taken place amid relatively favourable conditions in SMA,
they help to further illuminate why and how local PPPs in Korea often
fail to meet expectations.
2. Challenges of local PPPs
Perhaps the most frequently deployed argument in favour of PPPs is
that the government gets value-for-money in delivering public infra-
structure by bringing the advantages of competitive procurement pro-
cesses, risk allocation between the public and private sectors, and
advanced skills and management technology (Akintoye, Taylor, Beck,
Chinyio, & Asenova, 2003; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). The reputed ineffi-
ciency of the traditional public provision of infrastructure and services,
especially in terms of time management and capital costs, has further
boosted the adoption of PPPs (Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002). In short,
cash-strapped local governments are increasingly hoping to save costs,
share risks, and improve public service quality by tapping into the pri-
vate sector's expertise and strengths, making PPP a new instrumental
and normative mechanism for public service provision.
However, the benefits of PPPs are hardly assured. The literature sug-
gests quite a few critical factors for the success of PPPs in public infra-
structure, including financial and commercial factors, technical factors,
political and legal factors, and social factors (Ozdganm & Birgonul,
2000; Ng et al., 2012). Each of these factors is discussed in turn.
First, the financial and commercial factors refer to the financial feasi-
bility of the project, including its profitability, overall stability of the eco-
nomic environment, and the ability to attract foreign capital. Long-term
PPP contracts for large-scale projects tend to have high risks associated
with unpredictable and uncontrollable circumstances that the private
sector is not willing to bear. Hence, to attract the private sector, local
governments often end up with a disproportionate share of the risk
(Johnson,McCormally, &Moore, 2002; Forrer, Kee, & Zhang, 2002). Fur-
thermore, the private sector might be less confident of local economic
conditions and the possibility of volatility, as compared to national con-
ditions. Local governments are often forced to provide more incentives
to private companies, given the former's apparent lack of scale and un-
certainties in expected demand (Bel, Brown, &Marques, 2013). Only se-
lect big cities and projects would end up benefiting from the expansion
of the global financial investment market; even then, it might result in
undesirable consequences of financing and thus increase the risks for
public infrastructure development (Palcic and Reeves, 2011).
Second are the technical factors, which are related to the possibility
of stable management of sizable projects and the innovative skills and
technology that private partners can contribute. Long-term contracts,
especially for large infrastructure development, in effect eliminate mar-
ket competition by producing a long-term monopoly for the selected
private partner (van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). There are a number of
cases where the ‘monopolization’ of the private sector in PPPs has re-
sulted in delayed procurement, higher costs for both consumers and
governments, and renegotiation between the public and private sectors
(Cruz & Marques, 2013).
Third, and most important, difficult problems might arise for PPPs
from the political and legal environment, which is supposed to involve
a stable and experienced government, a transparent and competitive
tendering system, and an adequate regulatory and institutional frame-
work for the PPP system towork well. For example, the local public sec-
tor is often considered to be no match for the private sector in drawing
up complex and technical PPP contracts (Sclar, 2015; Dannin, 2011).
There is a strong ‘information asymmetry’ (Siemiatycki, 2013; Sclar,
2000) and a gap in specialized expertise (Werkman and Westerling,
2000) between the two partners. In many cases, local governments
lack the capacity to monitor and manage the private partners' pursuit
of strategic goals under the PPP arrangements, and often fail to ensure
the partners' contracted contribution to the public value. When it
comes to transparency to thepublic, there is also theproblemof govern-
ments themselves having a disincentive to disclose accurate informa-
tion about the contracts (Bloomfield, 2006), as the PPPs allow them to
obtain short-term benefits of public infrastructure and service delivery
while spreading costs over the long term (Hodge & Greve, 2007). In
fact, the PPP decisions are not merely technical solutions that are free
from political influence; they can be highly political (Shaoul, 2005;
Roberts, 2010). Particularly when it comes to local politicians consider-
ing their next elections, their political timetable is prone to being
trapped in ‘optimism bias,’ omitting appropriate appraisals and
overestimating expected revenue for the PPPs (Grimsey & Lewis,
2004). Short-term political decisions therefore frequently end up pro-
ducing irresponsible long-term contracts, and in this context, there is
now an argument for the need to acknowledge the political nature of
PPPs, and to re-politicize them, by bringing debate over its policy alter-
natives into public forums (Higgins and Huque, 2014).
A final critical issue is to social factors, which include public accep-
tance of the project and the price of service, as illustrated in the case
of serious public protests over the water concession in Cochabamba,
Bolivia (Nickson and Vargas, 2002). The local PPPs in Korea provide an
intriguing insight into economic nationalism amid globalization. De-
spite Korea's economic liberalization and globalization strategies, civil
society and themedia have increasingly been concernedwith the grow-
ing presence of visible foreign capital in the Koreanmarket (Lee, 2012).
With the rising trend of local PPPs involving foreign investors, it might
not be easy to achieve public acceptance once the details of the PPPs at-
tract the public's attention.
As examined in this section, local PPPs face a number of critical
challenges to arrive at successful outcomes. It is thus not surprising to
find rather discouraging empirical evidence of local PPP contracts
(Bloomfield, 2006; Hodge & Greve, 2007), despite a strong conceptual
idea and globally active promotion of PPPs by international agencies
(Miraftab, 2004). Because local PPPs have spread globally, becoming
part of many local governments' strategies to deliver public infrastruc-
ture and services to keep upwith urban expansion, it is worthwhile ex-
amining these PPPswith careful attention to the aforementioned factors
discussed here.
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3. Case analysis: urban transportation PPPs in Korean cities
Korea is known for its economic development in the 1960s to 1980s
under a strong, centralized, developmental state. The public sector had
been the principal provider of infrastructure and service for most of
the post-war period. After democratization in 1987 and the decline of
the developmental state, Korea sought to increase its global competi-
tiveness and embraced neoliberalism. To promote efficient provision
of public infrastructure by attracting the private sector, it enacted the
Private Capital Investment Promotion Act (1994). During the first
phase, some road, railway, and port projects were initiated under the
build–transfer–operate (BTO) mode where the private concessionaire
is granted the right to operate infrastructure. Due to the immature cap-
ital market and inexperienced Korean government, however, PPPs did
not take off at the time (Ahn, 2012).
Two subsequent events set the stage for the boom of PPPs in the
2000s. First was the Asian economic crisis of 1997, which led to govern-
ment budget cuts. The government turned to the private sector for the
delivery of public services and infrastructure development, and set up
a few inducement strategies such as cheaper rent, national and local
tax exemptions, infrastructure credit guarantees, and employment
and construction subsidies. The Korean government also attempted to
stimulate the domestic economy and repair Korea's reputation, which
had been hit by the crisis, by attracting more private investment. In
1998, the government passed the Act on Private Participation in Infra-
structure, which provided for preferential treatment to concessionaires;
since then, the number of private sector-initiated PPP projects (unsolic-
ited projects) has been particularly bolstered, with private investors ea-
gerly snatching the opportunity to make more profit (Fig. 1).
The most influential strategy was the government's guarantee of
base revenue for the private partners through the Minimum Revenue
Guarantee scheme (MRG).1 Under this scheme, the government prom-
ised to pay the concessionaires the difference between the actual oper-
ating revenue and the projected revenue of the project. From 1995 to
2003, the Korean government on average guaranteed 90% of the
projected revenue to the private investor for 20 years (Ministry of
Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, 2011).
The MRG set the stage for providing excessive support to private in-
vestors, further increasing their already strong power in the partner-
ship. As Table 1 shows, expressway construction and operation PPPs
had accurately estimated traffic volume only 59.6% of the time as of
2009, resulting in the government having to pay private partners large
sums every year. Other forms of financial support, such as construction
subsidies, infrastructure credit guarantees and tax incentives, have also
become burdensome for the government.
Secondly, the decentralization reform and local democracy that
began in the mid-1990s led to the rise of local infrastructure PPPs. It
was expected that decentralization would empower local governments
to align public expenditures with the varying preferences of citizens in
different localities, and help local governments to pursue their own pri-
orities and economic strategies (Bolton & Roland, 1997). However, the
reality has been different. In particular, local governments often find
themselves under fiscal constraints (Prud'homme, 1995). In these cir-
cumstances, PPPs offer an easier way to raise money for public use as
compared to raising taxes or issuing local bonds that are associated
with up-front costs and public resistance (Vining, Boardman, &
Poschmann, 2005, 201).
Korea, which had been a highly centralized state, began a process of
decentralization in 1995. The massive transfer of political and adminis-
trative power to subnational governments under decentralization in-
cluded the institution of direct popular elections of local executives
(bothmayors and governors aswell as district heads) and local council-
lors. The new central–local relationship has important implications for
the proliferation of PPPs at the local level. First, despite substantial prog-
ress in political and administrative decentralization, local fiscal autono-
my is still limited, and themajority of tax decisions remain in the hands
of the central government. It is also difficult for local governments to re-
spond to rapidly changing local demands and the external environment
in a timely manner because the local tax structure is heavily dependent
upon property-related taxes (Jeong & Jung, 2011). Moreover, since the
1997 economic crisis, local incomehas becomemore dependent on cen-
tral subsidies and grants, which are usually ring-fenced for nationally
delegated affairs. The outcome has been declining local fiscal autonomy
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Fig. 2). Administrative decentraliza-
tion without appropriate fiscal transfers, combined with growing de-
mands for local welfare and basic social security services, has imposed
an additional financial burden on local governments.2
Second, as elected local executives have been given power over the
budget, personnel and policy decisions of local governments through
political decentralization (Cho, Hong, Heo, & Oh, 2013), fiscal con-
straints and increased popular demands on local governments under
local democracy have led local politicians to eagerly prescribe PPPs.
This inclination has been further boosted by the central government's
push for PPP, for example through the MRG system. Because fiscal af-
fairs remain centralized, local governments can supplement the private
investment with central and provincial government funding for impor-
tant local infrastructure and developmental projects—mega infrastruc-
ture and landmarks that can increase a local executives' chances in
elections. However, the central government, despite its partial financial
support, is reluctant to intervene in local fiscal spending, as empowered
local politicians criticize the central supervision as a violation of the con-
stitutional principle of local autonomy or a jurisdictional dispute (Ahn,
2009).3 As such, implicit central–local tensions can exist over local
PPPs that provide short or mid-term financial resources to subnational
governments and relieve central financial pressure that would other-
wise have come from directly assisting local infrastructural needs.
To understand the multifaceted and multi-layered relationships in
local PPPs, we examine two local PPP cases: the construction of Light
Rail Transit (LRT) in Yong-In and the construction of the Seoul Metro
Line Nine (SNML) in Seoul.
Fig. 1. Project investment by private proposals (unsolicited). Source: Korea Development
Institute (2014), p. 83–4. Unit: 100 Million KRW.
1 In some other countries, like India, the scheme is known as the VGF (viability gap
fund).
2 Interview with a bureaucrat at Gyeong-gi Province, February 24, 2015.
3 Interview with an assistant director of Audit and Inspection Institute on 7 December,
2015.
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3.1. Yong-In LRT: the case of light rail transit
As one of the fastest-growing cities in SMA, the city of Yong-In has
exhibited strong development potential and relatively healthy local fi-
nances. From 2000 to 2012, its population grew nearly 2.5 times, and
is now nearly one million. Due to the rapid population growth, the
city has spent a substantial portion of its budget on transportation infra-
structure, especially to connect to Seoul. However, the city became no-
torious for abusing its local budget and misusing PPP in its large-scale
urban infrastructure projects.
The most egregious misuse of PPP has been the light rail transit
(LRT) project. The LRT was viewed as a reasonably priced mass transit
option and was expected to reduce traffic congestion and improve air
quality. In addition, because the LRT was to be linked to major subway
systems through interconnecting stations, it was expected to allow eas-
ier access to other parts of the city—in particular, tourist sites such as
Yong-In Everland (a theme park)—and of course to Seoul. The Ministry
of Construction and Transportation (MOCT, nowMinistry of Land, Infra-
structure and Transport) undertook a feasibility study for thenew trans-
portation system and concluded that LRT would be a good option in
terms of effective land use and environmental sustainability in smaller
or medium-sized cities (Ryoo & Lee, 2013). Based on this research, the
Gyeong-gi provincial government recommended that Yong-In consider
this option in August 1995.
The project eventually got off the ground with the 1999 by-election,
in which the mayoral candidate Ye Kang-Whan highlighted the project
as one of his key campaign promises. After Ye's successful election, he
formulated a scheme to attract private capital for the LRT project. In
the 2002 local election, both mayoral candidates (Mayor Ye and the
challenger Lee Jung-Moon) promised to push forward the LRT project
in their campaigns. Under Mayor Lee (who won the election), bids for
the Yong-In LRT (‘Yong-In Ever Line’) were solicited in 2002, with a
hasty feasibility test, and the ‘Yong-In LRT Consortium’ was selected
through a competitive bidding process. Themain contractor for the con-
sortium was the Canadian aerospace and transport company, Bombar-
dier (60%).4 In July 2004, an agreement was finalized between the
consortium and the local government, awarding the thirty-year conces-
sion by way of a BTO agreement. The total construction cost was esti-
mated to be 727.8 billion KRW (US$654 million), of which private
investment comprised 58.8%.5 Construction began in 2005.
Despite the project having a strong potential for profit in the rapidly
growing Yong-In, the local government was unable to strike a
favourable deal with the private consortium. In fact, the project's posi-
tive development prospects—which were necessary to boost its
legitimacy—seemed only to have led to a serious over-estimation of
the number of passengers by both Bombardier and the Korea Transport
Institute. For example, the Korea Transport Institute conducted a feasi-
bility study in 2001 and estimated 183,000 daily passengers by 2011
and 197,000 passengers by 2016, which were even higher than the
Bombardier's estimates.6 When the Board of Auditing and Inspection
later re-estimated the expected demand, it found it to be only 10,000
passengers a day in 2013 and 50,000 passengers a day in 2014 (Yong-
In Today April 30, 2013). Under the rationale of risk-sharing, the local
government had guaranteed 90% of the expected base fare (MRG),
which implied that the city had to compensate Yong-In LRT Co. about
2.5 trillion KRW (US$ 2.2 billion) over 30 years.
In fact, there had been an opportunity to correct the unfair relation-
ship with the private investors. In 2004, city councillors and a number
of civic organizations pointed out the infeasibility of the project by
highlighting the overestimation of riders and possible losses of one tril-
lion KRW (US$ 898 million).7 The central government (MOSF) also
warned that the MRG rate was too high and recommended a steady re-
duction, but this warning was disregarded by the city government.8 Fac-
ingmuch criticism, however, in 2009Mayor Seo Jeong-Seok renegotiated
with the consortium to reduce theMRG from 90% to 79.8%. The following
mayor, Kim Hak-Gyu, cancelled the contract in 2011, after the mass
media revealed possible fraud and abuse of local government power.
The consortiumquickly filed a claim for damages against the city through
the International Court of Arbitration, and won the lawsuit after a fierce
4 SBS news, ‘Yong-In LRT, the ‘disaster’ has not yet even begun.’ April 29, 2013, accessed
at http://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1001760833 on March 19, 2015.
5 City of Yong-In internal document, ‘A Report on the Status of Private Investment Pro-
jects’ (February 5, 2013).
6 Naeil Newspaper andCitizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, ‘BadMega-sizedNational
Projects 1, Yong-In/Euijeongbu LRT,’October 24, 2013, accessed at http://www.naeil.com/
news_view/?id_art=86791 on December 12, 2015.
7 JoongAng Daily, ‘Yong-In LRT, Not Outraged City Council and Citizens…Disaster al-
ready expected,’ February 18, 2011, accessed at http://article.joins.com/news/article/
article.asp?ctg=12&total_id=5073240 on January 15, 2014.
8 Interview with an assistant director of Audit and Inspection Research Institute on 7
December 2015.
Table 1
MRG and redemption of excess revenue in expressway projects.
Source: Kim, Kim, Shin, and Lee (2011).
Expressways Total investment 2009 projected traffic (A) 2009 actual traffic (B) Accuracy (B/A) MRG subsidy paid
Incheon Exp. 17,440 146,282 62,165 42.5% 7333
Cheonan–Nonsan Exp. 17,297 60,034 34,437 57.4% 2958
Daegu–Busan Exp. 27,477 62,127 34,361 55.3% 1723
Seoul Ring Exp. 22,792 78,084 72,865 93.3% Δ27
Busan–Ulsan Exp. 14,777 35,609 15,599 52.2% 317
Yongin–Seoul Exp. 15,256 153,250 80,082 52.3% 24
Seoul–Choonchun Exp. 21,833 44,923 29,118 64.8% 36
Sum 136,872 – – Ave. 59.6% 12,364
Unit: 100 million KRW, as of 2009.
Fig. 2. Fiscal Independence Ratio (%) in local governments. Source: Ministry of Public
Administration and Safety (2012), Local Finance Yearbook. Note: Fiscal Independence
Ratio (%) = local income / local budget.
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two-year legal battle. The court ordered the city to compensate the con-
sortium by about 800 billion KRW (US$ 719 million).
A project that largely began as the political tool of local politicians ul-
timately produced unfair contracts and left the residents and subse-
quent mayors to cope with the damage. In order to compensate the
consortium for MRG payments, the city had to issue 500 billion KRW
(US$ 450million) of local bonds, and total local debt reached 694 billion
KRW (US$ 624 million) as of 2012. Yong-In is also suffering financial
losses froma number of other BTOprojects, including sewage treatment
facilities and expressway construction. The favourable development
conditions of this mid-sized city provided a stage on which local politi-
cians took opportunities to promise and execute various projects via
PPP, allowing them to build short-term political assets but leaving be-
hind a huge financial burden for the city.
3.2. Seoul metro line nine: the case of a subway line
The city of Seoul surpasses any other city in Korea in terms of its po-
litical and economic significance. It is the only city given the title of ‘Spe-
cial City’, and has a fiscal independence rate of 100%.With its population
of 10million, Seoul receives significantlymore attention than the rest of
the country from the media and the national government, as well as
from NGOs and civil society organizations.
The prospects for the SeoulMetro LineNine (SMLN), the first private
metro in the city, were strong. Seoul, which had begun constructing its
subway system since 1974, already had an extensive network of 327 km
of tracks, and carried about seven million passengers daily. Integrating
into this network, the SMLN (originally planned in the early 1990s)
was to traverse the southern part of Seoul (Kangnam) as a 25.5-
kilometre-long artery line. The project was expected to fare well as it
would provide extended services in the heavily developed Kangnam
area.
Following its approval by the MOCT in 2002, the local government
decided to invite private investors in order to adopt the private sector's
innovative management, with the hope of overcoming the chronic op-
erating deficits that had characterized public sector operation. Under
Mayor Lee Myung-Bak (who later became president of Korea), the
SMLN Consortium was selected in 2003, and the 30-year BTO conces-
sion was finalized in 2005. The consortium comprised Hyundai-Rotem
(25%), an Australian investment firm — Macquarie Infrastructure
(MKIF, 24.5%), Shinhan Bank (14.9%), and other private investors.
Mayor Lee had a strong belief in the private sector (he had been CEO
at Hyundai Construction Company prior to becoming a politician) and
sought to burnish his mayoral accomplishments by improving Seoul's
public transportation system. As a result, the local government sought
to swiftly execute PPP, granting undue favours to private investors in
the process. First of all, as with the Yong-In LRT project, an excessive
MRG was granted: the contract promised an MRG of 90% for the first
five years of operations, 80% for the next five years, and 70% for the
rest of the concession period. In return for the declining ratio, the local
government allowed a 43% higher base fare in the contract than the
one suggested by the consortium. Many Korean citizens and congress-
men complained that the consortium's guaranteed profits were unjusti-
fied, considering the amount of the investment contributed by the
consortium. In fact, national and city government subsidies covered
more than 80% of the 3.4 trillion KRW of total construction costs (Park
& Kim, 2013:63). This meant that despite bearing at most 20% of total
construction costs, the consortium was permitted to operate the sub-
way for 30 years with favourable MRG (Park & Kim, 2013).
Another problem raised by a civic organization (Citizen's Coalition
for Economic Justice) was the fact that MKIF, the Australian investment
firm, wasmaking substantial loans to the consortium at an interest rate
of 15%.9 Consequently, the consortiumwas paying a significant amount
to MKIF as interest (on top of the loan itself), and this was problematic,
because the city government had guaranteed the consortiumminimum
revenue equivalent to the 8.9% internal rate of return. After the comple-
tion of SMLN in 2009, the local government paid the consortium 14.2
billion KRW (US$ 12.7 million) in 2009, 32.4 billion KRW (US$ 29 mil-
lion) in 2010, and 24.6 billion (US$ 22million) in 2011, even though op-
erations revenues were increasing.10
Against this backdrop, in 2012 the consortium also attempted to in-
crease the base subway fare by 50% without warning. This triggered ex-
tensive discontent among citizens and was strongly opposed by the
Seoul government, which charged that increasing the fare without
prior consultation was in violation of the contract. After wrangling
over fares, the consortium in the end withdrew the fare increase plan,
but a few weeks later filed a complaint against the city government. A
year later, the Seoul Administrative Court ruled that the city
government's rejection of the SMLN's increase of fare was legitimate.
What became known to the public during this controversy was the
fact that MKIF was making huge profits in the Korean PPP market in
general. Since 2002, it has invested 1.77 trillion KRW (US$ 1.6 billion)
in fourteen major infrastructure development projects, with more
than 60% of the investment in the form of subordinated loans at high in-
terest rates. As Fig. 3 shows, MKIF has consistently raised significant in-
come through interest earnings ofmore than 100 billion KRW(US$ 89.8
million) since themid-2000s. When this information was exposed dur-
ing the legal dispute between the city and the consortium over the
metro fare, the Korean public reacted angrily to the drainage of national
and city wealth to a foreign investment firm.
Civic associations demanded that the SMLN contract be
restructured,11 and the local government negotiated a deep cut in the
rate of return guaranteed to the private consortium. Following this de-
cision, MKIF decided to pull out of the SMLN project in August 2013. Al-
though the local government of Seoul demonstrated a stronger hand in
handling the situation in the end, as compared to Yong-In, the problem
was the same: the lopsided design of the PPP contract favoured private
investors to benefit at the expense of local governments.
4. Discussion
The two cases illustrated here suggest that the promise of PPPs in
terms of value-for-money has been far from realized in Korea. Few ben-
efits from the private sector were added into the projects, primarily be-
cause of lopsided contracts that guaranteed high returns with little risk
to the private sector, in particular the MRG policy. While the criticisms
of local PPPs in the West have chiefly related to the difficulties of
enforcing private sector performance guarantees (Bloomfield, 2006),
Korean local PPPs have in fact produced contracts that guaranteed profit
for the private sector, while allocating all investment risks to the public
sector. The public partner was not responsible for enforcing the private
partner's performance, but was instead guaranteeing its profit,
completely eliminating any motivation to perform well. It is not a sur-
prise, then, that the Korean PPPmarket became a highly attractive play-
ground, especially for international finance. What is surprising is why
such unfair PPP contracts were possible in the first place.
One of the key explanations is that PPPs in the two cases were far
from apolitical and technical solutions; on the contrary, they displayed
a strong political dimension. Local politicians pride themselves on
their ability to quickly find and attract a private partner for a major in-
frastructure project. In practice, this often required exceedingly biased
contracts. As such, in both Yong-In and Seoul, the contracts were rashly
signed in the first couple of years of the new mayor's term. In other
words, PPPs became important political tools of the locally elected
mayors, whowere seeking short-term political gains. This was accentu-
ated by limited local financial resources and an immature regulatory
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framework at the subnational level under a relatively new local
democracy.
Even when considering the subsequent elections, which take place
every four years, the large infrastructure PPPs continue to act in the fa-
vour of the mayor who initiated the project. A study showed that from
1999 to 2010, candidates who had successfully launched a large-scale
infrastructure development project in their previous term had much
higher chances of re-election (Kim & Lee, 2012). The impact of signing
the contract carried on positively to the second election, which usually
occurred fairly soon after the start of the project, but the debt from
such PPP projects became visible only much later. And because Korean
mayors can run for a maximum of three terms (which itself rarely hap-
pens in the intensely competitive political system), by the time the
problems surfaced and became openly controversial in the public
arena, there was little chance they would influence the mayors' re-
election fate. In fact, for both Seoul and Yong-In, it was only under the
subsequent mayors that civil society demanded greater accountability
and led local governments to try and renegotiate the poorly performing
contracts.
In short, it is understandable why there was no careful prior evalua-
tion of theprojects, or even if therewas, itwas quickly ignored. An inter-
view with a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Government Administration
and Home Affairs illustrates the strong political motivation inherent in
the local Korean PPPs:
The reason for the failure ofmany of these local PPP projects (includ-
ing the LRT) is that the popularly elected mayors tend to either ig-
nore the evaluation of the project, or do not even carry one out
properly. The underlying reason for this is their political motives.
They are thinking about re-election and catering to the demands of
their constituents.12
Additionally, under the ‘strong mayor system’ of local governments,
local councils were not effective in checking local executives' growth-
oriented expenditure. Therewas also limited opportunity for the central
government to regulate local financial activities like PPPs, because any
regulatory action by the central government was considered to be
‘anti-decentralization’ in the process of decentralization reform (Bae,
in press).With the strong electoral political power over the bureaucracy
in a politically decentralized Korea, it becomes clear why risky local
PPPs, approved without careful evaluation and deliberation, became
prominent.
In addition to politicians' rent-seeking behaviour, it is also important
to consider that the fiscal constraints of the local governments after the
decentralization helped set the stage for local politicians to legitimize
and attract PPPs, amid increasing needs for public infrastructure and
services. This structural condition pressures local politicians to seek su-
pranational capital from firms such as Bombardier and MKIF with vari-
ous revenue guarantees and support, eventually resulting in a ‘systemic
power imbalance’ between local governments and private capital. In
the age of globalization and Free Trade Agreements, local governments
do not have adequate legal or regulatory frameworks to protect local
stakeholders in PPPs that involve foreign capital. Other related public
actors that should be acting as watchdogs—including the central
government—might also perceive private investment in infrastructure
as the only available option, hoping that the joint forces of eager local
politicians and a competitive and capable private partner will solve
their urban infrastructure problems.
So far, we have considered local fiscal constraints as one of themajor
reasons behind the unfair PPP contracts. However, the lack of financial
independence at the local level could also suggest higher dependence
on the central government, who then earns someof the blame for failing
to prevent such outrageous contracts. As a matter of fact, the outcome
wehave studied in this paperwas only possible because the central gov-
ernment set the stage with its MRG policy. In a way, we can close the
loop here by highlighting the fact that as local PPP contracts began to
manifest their problems over time, and after several legal disputes, the
MRG was abolished in 2009. This helps explain the sharp drop in the
number of local PPP contracts after 2009 (Fig. 4).
In short, under the combined circumstances of local fiscal con-
straints, pervasive political opportunism, and growing involvement of
transnational investors, PPPs in Korean local governments have been
politically designed and implemented without a proper institutional
framework. The bias towards electoral politics in developing long-
term local PPP contracts in the context of nascent decentralization and
democracy will likely lead to failure rather than increasing local public
benefit, accountability and public discourse.
5. Conclusion
Amid the increasing adoption of PPPs among rapidly and massively
urbanizing Asian cities, it is high time to direct attention to examining
the local contextual environment of PPPs. This paper illustrates how
local PPPs in Korea have been strongly pushed by both local politicians
and private partners to fulfil their own goals, amid fully-fledged political
Fig. 3. Financial performance of MKIF in the Korean PPPMarket. Source: MKIF, Macquarie
Korea Infrastructure Fund Audit Report, 2005–2013. Note: % of interest income =
(interest income / total income) ∗ 100.
12 Interviewwith a bureaucrat at Ministry of Government Administration and Home Af-
fairs, February 25, 2015.
Fig. 4. Number of PPPs at different levels of government. Source: Korea Development
Institute (2014), p. 82–3. Note: ‘Mixed’ refer to cases that national government initiates
and local governments manage.
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and administrative decentralization and local fiscal constraints. Eager to
raise ‘visibility’ in the political marketplace and to attract private part-
ners, elected local executives are keen to guarantee profit for the private
sector, and structure PPP contracts so that a rigorous feasibility evalua-
tion cannot be conducted. This, in effect, results in well-alignedmotives
between the twopartners. In the prevailing circumstances—where both
the public and the private partner gain much in the short term from the
‘unfairly’ designed contracts—the discussion of PPPs should move be-
yond the systemic power imbalance between the ‘public’ and ‘private’
partners.
Furthermore, for those localities deprived of developmental potential
in the global economy, the argument that there is an inherent power im-
balance between the public and the private partners—and in particular,
experienced global investors—is a gross understatement. Devoid of
their own local private sectors, such markets are powerless to attract a
private partner, and thus do not even attempt to impose appropriate
checking mechanisms to ensure that a private partner bears its share of
the risks and brings competitiveness into the partnership.
Lastly, Korea's experience, as introduced in this paper, suggests that
as PPPs are expanding globally, we need to paymore careful attention to
the political and institutional environments in which PPP contracts are
planned and executed. In a striking contrast to the local private sector,
whose fate is tied to local economic growth, Korea's local PPPs are
attracting international finance loans. In fact, unregulated international
capital is avidly seeking new, speculative investment opportunities in
urban development projects outside the West, in the rapidly growing
and urbanizing countries, via private equities and debt-financing firms
(Goldman, 2011). These foreign investment firms are extremely specu-
lative in their urban project portfolios, yet demand a guaranteed rate of
return for investing in so-called highly risky markets. The outcome of
such ‘partnerships’ is a worsened fate for already questionable local
PPPs, since the private partner's real interest lies not in maximizing its
own profit from the development, but in pursuing a high rate of invest-
ment returns in a speculative and volatile manner.
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